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A B S T R A C T
The provision of public goods, such as voluntary enforcement efforts, can be critical to the management of
natural resources. However, the degree to which context can influence people's contributions to the public good
is poorly understood. Here, we used sequential games in a ‘lab in the field’ experimental setting with a fishing
community in Papua New Guinea to explore whether behavior in two particular contexts—market and
trust—spill over public goods' contributions. Behavioral spillovers occur when behavior in one context influ-
ences—or is transferred to—behavior in another context. Our results indicate that there is spillover, but sur-
prisingly this occurs from specific roles assumed within the context rather than the broader context itself. The
existence of behavioral spillovers into public goods can render conservation initiatives that rely on contributions
ineffective, or even damaging if they crowd out intrinsic behavior. Understanding the potential biases different
context—e.g. markets created by market-based instruments or trust relied upon by community-based mechan-
ism—can create, is necessary for the implementation of effective and efficient conservation initiatives.
1. Introduction
Many conservation and environmental management initiatives deal
with public goods (i.e. those that are non-rivalrous and non-exclud-
able). In some cases, these initiatives may target the provision of public
goods directly, such as limiting pollution into the ocean which can di-
minish the public goods provided by the ocean (recreational opportu-
nities, carbon storage, etc.). While in other cases, these initiatives may
depend indirectly on the provision of public goods, such community-
managed fishing programs that rely on self-monitoring and enforce-
ment (Cinner et al., 2012a; Cinner et al., 2012b). Although the stock of
fish is considered a common good (also known as common pool re-
source), monitoring and enforcement efforts can be considered a public
good for the community. While public goods' contributions, often used
as a measure of cooperation, have been a topic of significant theoretical
research (Clarke, 1971; Bergstrom et al., 1986; Cornes and Sandler,
1996), and experimental studies (Andreoni, 1990; Fehr and Gachter,
2000; Chaudhuri, 2011; Basurto et al., 2016), little is known about the
degree to which people's contributions to public goods are context de-
pendent.
An increasing body of literature suggests preferences not always
follow standard choice theory (value maximization) resulting in deci-
sions that overlook the highest value alternative, meaning preferences
can be context dependent (Bowles, 1998; Tversky and Simonson, 1993;
Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). Although the number of studies that
look at the influence of context in preferences is increasing, they are
mostly experimental. Still, no work has looked at the influence contexts
might have on public good contributions, either experimentally in the
lab or in the field. For conservation initiatives that want to leverage the
use of public goods to achieve conservation goals it is of utmost im-
portance to understand if contributions can be context dependent, and
how different contexts might influence contributions.
A key way of approaching the issue of context-dependent public
goods contributions may be through behavioral spillovers (Thøgersen,
1999). Behavioral spillovers is still considered an emerging field in
which some studies have use similar but not identical definitions (Cason
et al., 2012; Nash et al., 2017; Galizzi and Whitmarsh, 2019), while
others have focused in particular behaviors such as cooperation (Cason
and Gangadharan, 2013), rationality (Cherry et al., 2003), or en-
vironmental protection (Lanzini and Thøgersen, 2014). Broadly
speaking behavioral spillovers refer to behavior in one context influ-
encing—or being transferred to—behavior in another context (Galizzi
and Whitmarsh, 2019). In a related body of literature, the idea of
context influencing preferences has been attributed to a ‘framing effect’
akin to the cognitive bias of the same name (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981). Initially framing was researched using positive versus negative
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wording for statements with the same underlying consequences to ex-
amine how, for example loss versus gain framing influence people's
decisions and behaviors in a range of settings (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981; Hossain and List, 2012). These initial framing studies have re-
cently been expanded by using different contexts with the same un-
derlying decision processes to examine how, for example, a market
context can crowd out people's preferences for other-regarding beha-
vior (Falk and Szech, 2013; Bartling et al., 2015b).
Here, we examine the potential for spillover into public goods
contributions from two domains of increasing relevance to conservation
and environmental management initiatives: market and trust contexts.
First, the market context is relevant because more and more con-
servation initiatives are using market-based mechanisms to address
environmental issues (Stavins and Whitehead, 1992; Stavins, 2003;
Kroeger and Casey, 2007). Market-based mechanism encompass in-
struments (price, quantity) and regulation (market friction and gov-
ernment subsidy reduction) whose primary characteristic is encoura-
ging behavior through market signals (Stavins, 2003). A prominent
example is the tradable permits—cap-and-trade1—program for air
pollution in the US, with the type, range, and number of market-based
mechanism constantly increasing around the world (Stavins, 2003;
Pagiola, 2008; Vatn, 2010). Second, many conservation initiatives use
collective action and community-based approaches for resource man-
agement, which rely on trust for cohesion of the community and
achievement of the goals (Ostrom, 2010). Trust has been shown to
promote cooperation and reduce free-riding behavior in public goods
games (De Cremer et al., 2001). These contexts could activate different
heuristics related to pro-social behavior; markets, for example, can
activate ‘economic incentive’ heuristic while trust can activate the
‘social cognition’ heuristic (Declerck and Boone, 2016). We ask “do
market and trust contexts ‘spill over’ into public goods contributions?”
To answer the question of whether context influences spillovers into
contributions to public goods we used an economic laboratory experi-
ment in the field (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008) in the fishing com-
munity of Ahus Island, Papua New Guinea. The experiment consisted of
a control and two treatments. The control group played a standard
public goods game that asked subjects for contributions to a group fund
that benefited all members of the group equally (Ledyard, 1994; Dawes
and Thaler, 1988). Treatment 1 (market context) also played the public
goods game, but this was preceded by a trade/bilateral bargaining
game (Smith, 1982). Likewise, treatment 2 (trust context) also played
the public goods game, but in this case, it was preceded by a trust game
(Berg et al., 1995). Thus, each treatment had two sequential, and in-
dependent games. The first game exposed subjects to a context while
the second game examined their contributions to public goods. The
sequential setting allowed us to determine existence of spillovers
(Galizzi and Whitmarsh, 2019) into public goods' contributions, and—if
they existed—whether they differ across treatments by comparing them
to a control (no context).
To our knowledge, this is the first time that the trust, trade, or
public goods games have been played in Papua New Guinea. However,
previous experimental economics research in Papua New Guinea has
demonstrated some unusual results with regards to perceptions of
equity (Henrich et al., 2001; Tracer, 2003; Henrich et al., 2010). For
example, players in an ultimatum game (a game in which the first
player (sender) offers the second player (receiver) a sum of money, who
can then decide to accept or reject the offer, but if rejected, both players
receive nothing) in Papua New Guinea tended to not only reject offers
that were too low, but also those that were “too high” (i.e. over 50% of
endowment) (Henrich et al., 2001). Importantly, this was behavior in
an ultimatum game that had not been observed before (Gintis, 2003).
Putting this in a cross-cultural context, these were the highest rejection
rates among any country highlighted in a meta-analysis of ultimatum
games (Oosterbeek et al., 2004). The authors concluded that the re-
jection of these “hyper-fair” offers was due to a cultural disposition of
not wanting to become engaged in a future reciprocity obligation,
which would carry an implicit notion of subservience (Tracer, 2003).
Similarly, Henrich et al. (2010) found that the mean allocations in a
dictator game (similar to the ultimatum game, but the receiver has no
opportunity to refuse) were high in Papua New Guinea, given the level
of market integration.
2. Methodology
2.1. Research site
Ahus is a small island (0.25 km2) of approximately 800 inhabitants
located ~25 Km off the coast from the Manus provincial capital,
Lorengau. The main activity in the island is fishing. Although trade was
historically based on bartering fish for vegetables and other supplies
(building materials, firewood) (Cinner, 2005), today monetary trans-
actions are the norm as markets and access to imported goods have
expanded. On the island, as well as in most of Papua New Guinea, land
ownership and fishing grounds are customary and clan-based (Cinner
et al., 2005; Cinner and Aswani, 2007). The average age of the popu-
lation in the island is 30 years old (s.d. 20.5), with ~63% over 18 years
old, and 48% female.
2.2. Experimental design
Our experimental design consisted of a control, whereby only a
public goods game was played, and two treatments. Treatment 1
(market context) consisted of a public goods game that was preceded by
a trade game, while treatment 2 (trust context) consisted of a public
goods game preceded by a trust game. We conducted 25 sessions with
six participants each. Treatments and controls were assigned randomly
to each session.
2.3. Subjects
Only adults (18 years old or older) were allowed to participate in
the experiment, with subjects self-selecting to participate (in a first-
come first-serve fashion) while maintaining general representativeness
of the four main clans in the island, as each clan was asked for a fixed
number of participants based on the island population. Subjects parti-
cipated at random in either the control or either of the two treatments.
The trade and trust games were played six rounds plus a practice round
at the beginning.
2.4. Payment
Subjects received payment for the public goods game and the pre-
ceding game (for the treatments). In the treatments, only one of the
rounds in the first game was paid. The round was selected at random
using a six-side dice rolled in front of all participants at the end of the
first game. In the control, only the public goods game was played, thus
subjects were given the expected average earnings (across treatments)
from the first game as a show up fee to account for payment biases.
Across treatments and control, the public goods game remained the
same and was played only once (one shot game).
2.5. Setting
To conduct the sessions an open area was subdivided into cubicles
1 Consider carbon dioxide emission for example, the country sets a total level
(cap) of carbon dioxide emissions and permits are given to companies to emit
certain amount of carbon dioxide to comply with the country's cap. If a com-
pany emits less than the permits they hold they can sell the rest, if they need to
emit more, they can buy permits from other companies that are below their
individual quota.
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to maintain anonymity between participants' decisions. Subjects were
given printed local currency (PGK) coins (two types: 1 Kina coins and
20 Toea coins– 100 Toea equals one Kina) to make their decisions. For
both treatments and the control, instructions were read out loud (in
Papua New Guinea's most used official language, Tok-Pisin) before
starting any games, communications was not allowed between subjects,
and questions were addressed individually.
2.6. Market context
Illustrated by a trade game in which subjects were randomly paired
and assigned a role (buyer/seller). The roles were the same across
rounds but the pairs were randomized in each round. Sellers were en-
dowed with a box they had to sell to their counterpart, while buyers
were endowed with money to purchase the box (14 Kina). Both buyer
and seller were asked to submit offers (bids) to exchange a box, the
range of the bids was from zero to 14 Kina—in increments of 20 Toea
(0.2 Kina). Offers to buy and sell were taken to their counterparts where
the subject had to make an initial offer first. If the offers were the same,
or if the offer to buy was higher than the offer to sell (the ask price
determined the actual price), the trade was completed; sellers earned
the price agreed and buyers earned 14 Kina minus the price. If the offers
were not the same, subjects were asked if they accepted the other
person's offer, if they rejected the other person's offer but wanted to
submit a counter offer, or if they rejected it and wanted to maintain
their previous offer (no counter offer). If both, buyer and seller, rejected
their counterparts' offers three consecutive times, no trade was made
and both subjects earned zero in that round (this result occurred only
once in the experiment). To make their offer, buyers had to make a bid
using the printed coins and put them in front of them, while sellers had
to take from the printed coins in front of them to indicate their ask.
Subjects had no time limit to make their offers.
2.7. Trust context
In the trust game subjects were randomly paired and assigned a role
(sender/receiver). The roles were the same across rounds but the pairs
were randomized in each round. Both roles were endowed with five
Kina each. Senders had to decide how much, if any, of their endowment
they wanted to send to the recipient, then the money sent was tripled
before it was delivered to the recipient. After receiving the money from
the senders, receivers had to decide how much, if any, of their money
(including their initial endowment) they wanted to send back to the
sender. Receivers were allowed to use their initial endowment to allow
comparison with previous studies. Receivers were in no obligation to
send money back. To make their decisions subjects had to use the
printed coins and put them in front of them. Inspired by the findings by
Henrich et al. (2001) that hyper-fair (> 50% of the sender's endow-
ment) offers were rejected in the ultimatum game likely due to a desire
to avoid potential reciprocal obligations in the future, we conducted a
supplemental analysis to examine whether analogous behavior was
observed in our trust game. Specifically, we hypothesized that if this
were the case in our study, we would find: 1) very few instances of
receivers not sending money back, and that 2) giving>50% back to
the sender would be more common when initial offers were hyper-fair
as a means of diffusing potential future obligations. Although, receivers
sending money back to the initial sender is often referred to as re-
ciprocity (Berg et al., 1995; Cárdenas et al., 2009), this term could be
inaccurate if the motivations behind doing so are not solely reciprocity
(e.g. self-image, social pressure, generosity). Thus, we refer to the ac-
tion of sending money back to the initial sender as ‘trustworthiness’
since it indicates that the trust (from the initial sender) was worth it.
2.8. Public goods game
The public goods game consisted of groups of three subjects
(randomly selected) that received the same endowment (6 Kina) and
had to decide how much of their endowment they wanted to contribute
to a group fund. Contributions were added, doubled, and divided
equally among the members of a group (marginal per capita return:
0.66). As in a standard public good game (Ledyard, 1994), higher
contributions resulted in higher individual income if the other members
did the same, but by withholding contributions a subject could reach
even higher income if the other members of the group contributed to
the fund. This game creates incentives for cooperation and free riding
depending on the expectations subject have on other members' con-
tributions. All decisions were simultaneous and independent. To make
their contribution, subjects placed the amount they wanted to con-
tribute in front of them using the printed coins. Subjects knew their
earning from the previous game before they had to make their con-
tribution decision.
2.9. Roles
Since the market and trust context have in themselves particular
roles (e.g. buyer and seller, or sender and receiver, respectively) that
could be associated to different context in people's minds and influence
contributions in various ways, we treat role as a covariate in our ana-
lysis. This is possible since subjects maintain their role for the entirety
of the study after they are randomly assigned. Using roles for our
analysis allow us to understand if contributions to public goods suffer
from spillovers from previous games that are particular to the roles in
the different contexts. The roles were fixed in the treatments to reduce
complexity, and confusion.
2.10. Analysis
The decisions in the trade game (bids, asks, prices), trust game
(money sent, money sent back), and public good game (contributions)
are examined using descriptive statistics as well as non-parametric tests
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon) and Fisher's exact test when appropriate. For
the public goods game we also used Cohen's D to examine the magnitude
of differences in contributions between the different roles (buyer, seller,
sender, receiver, and control) and gender. Further, to understand the
influence a context might have on contributions to public goods we de-
veloped two statistical models using least squared linear regressions. The
first model attempted to explain contributions to public goods based on
1) context; 2) earnings in the first game; 3) age, and 4) gender of the
subject. The second model replaced context with roles (the other vari-
ables remained the same). There were no problems of heteroscedasticity
or multicollinearity in the models. To check for robustness, we also
considered models with average earnings in the first game (instead of
actual earnings), different interactions between the variables, as well as
specifications with truncation (Tobit model). The different specifications
did not provide different qualitative results and the marginal change in
fitness (or significance) did not justify the added complexity (only the
least squared models will be presented, other models can be found in the
Appendix and Supplemental Material sections).
3. Results
Total average earning across treatments was 15.8 PGK for the
control, 15.6 PGK for the market treatment, and 15.9 PGK for the trust
treatment (Table 1).2 The average age of the participants in the control
was 35 years old, 29 years old in the market treatment, and 32 years old
in the trust treatment. 54% of the participants were self-identified fe-
male in the control, 42% in the market treatment, and 54% in the trust
treatment.
2 The minimum wage in rural fishing communities in Papua New Guinea (like
Ahus Island) is approximately 15 PGK a day (1 USD = 3.37 PGK).
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3.1. Market game
Prices in the trade game were on average 20% lower than the ex-
pected equilibrium price assuming equal bargaining power (7 PGK)
resulting in earning being 11% higher than the equal distribution for
buyers (the trade price was equal to the seller's offer if the buyer's offers
was lower than the seller's offer). The overall equilibrium price (5.8
PGK) in the trade game is below the expected equal distribution (7
PGK) under equal bargaining power and tends to stay under it
throughout the rounds (Fig. 1). Equilibrium prices over rounds pre-
sented minimum changes, consistent with randomized pairing. Most
trades (88%) were concluded by the second offer and the initial offer
was, in average, 7.2 PGK for sellers and 5.4 PGK for buyers. Initial offers
from buyers (bids) and sellers (asks) we close to the equal distribution
throughout the rounds, 50% of initial offers were ± 30% of theoretical
equal distribution price, while 60% of offers were 7 ± 1 PGK by the
second bid (Fig. 1 and Appendix 1).
3.2. Trust game
Trust (money sent by senders) and the money sent back from
receivers (trustworthiness, as defined in the methodology) stayed re-
latively constant, on average, throughout the rounds (Fig. 2C). Senders
initiated trust relationships (sent positive amounts) 97% of the time and
sent on average 58% of their endowment (Fig. 2A-C and Appendix 1).
Fig. 3 illustrates the relationship between senders and receivers deci-
sions. Of the instances in which subjects received money, 92% of them
sent money back, while in two occasions receivers who were sent
nothing sent money back from their endowment (Fig. 3). The average
amount sent back was 53% of the money received (Fig. 2B-2C and
Appendix 1). In 34% of the instances, receivers sent back less than the
original amount sent to them (before it was multiplied), while in ~49%
of cases the money sent back was 50% or more (equal split) of the
money received; in 22% of instances receivers sent back 100% or more
Table 1
Summary of variables and earnings.
N Mean SD
Earnings First Game Earning from the First
Game
Buyers* 24 7.8 3.0
Sellers* 24 5.6 2.8
Receivers 24 8.3 4.4
Senders 24 6.4 3.2
Control 54 7.0 0.0
Contribution to Public
Good
Contributions made to the
group fund
Buyers 24 2.5 1.4
Sellers 24 3.2 1.4
Receivers 24 2.0 1.7
Senders 24 3.1 1.6
Control 54 2.8 1.7
Age Age of the subject All 150 32 12
Gender Gender of the subject Female 75 – –
Male 75 – –
Total Earnings Total payoffs in the
experiment
Buyers 24 17.0 3.4
Sellers 24 14.2 3.4
Receivers 24 17.2 5.2
Senders 24 14.5 3.8
Control 54 15.8 1.7
Note: Mean and standard deviations (SD) are expressed in Kina (1 USD≅3.37
PGK). *One pair did not reach a price agreement and earn zero in one round
making average earnings in the trade game less than the equal distribution (7
PGK).
Fig. 1. Average initial Bid, initial ask, and trade price per round. Vertical lines
indicate standard errors. PGK=Papua New Guinea Kina.
Fig. 2. A. Frequency and density line of money (PGK) sent by senders (Trust). B.
Frequency and density line of the ratio of money (PGK) sent back by receivers
(Trustworthiness) over money received. C. Mean trust and trustworthiness by
rounds, vertical lines indicate standard errors.
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(using their endowment) of the money received (Fig. 3). Assuming two
levels for the money sent back (high ≥50% of the money received,
low<50% of the money received) and trust (high ≥50% of the en-
dowment, low<50% of the endowment), the level of money sent back
was independent of the level of trust (p-value 0.39 using Fisher's exact
test). Independence can be rejected when comparing the proportion of
instances in which subjects sent back> 100% of the money received (p-
value 0.02 using Fisher's exact test), with a higher proportion occurring
with low levels of trust.
3.3. Public goods game
Contributions in the public good game were, on average, 2.8 PGK
for the control, 2.9 PGK for the market treatment, and 2.5 PGK for the
trust treatment, with contributions in the market and trust treatments
not being statistically different to the control (p-value 0.87 and 0.27
respectively using Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). Looking closer at the
treatments we find within treatment differences in contributions to the
public good. Relative to control group contributions to the public good
game, sellers and senders contributed more (14% and 11% respec-
tively), while buyer and receivers contributed less (11% and 29% re-
spectively) (Table 1, Fig. 4). Effect size tests (Cohen's D) within treat-
ments shows medium differences (Cohen's D − 0.51, and 0.66)
between roles (Table 2). Although, these within treatment differences
seem to cancel out, such that the average public good contribution per
treatment is indistinguishable from the control.
The least square models (Appendix 2) confirm our previous results
while allowing us to control for the effect of the other potential re-
lationships such as the initial payment effect (money received in the
first game), age, and gender. Model selection criteria (AIC) favours the
model using roles instead of context, revealing that both the receiver
role and gender to be related to public goods contributions (Fig. 5,
n= 150, p= 0.016). Earnings in the first game (initial payment effect)
and age do not seem to be related to contributions while gender has a
statistically significant relationship—males contributed ~20% less to
the public good when compared to females in the control. The average
contribution for a 32 years old female that earned 7 PGK in the first
game is ~52% (3.1 PGK) of her endowment.
Fig. 3. Relationship between rates of trust and trust-
worthiness. The dashed line (red) indicate the threshold
for recipients that returned the money originally sent to
them (before being multiplied). The long dashed line
(blue) indicates recipient that returned half (50%) of the
money received (after being multiplied). The dot-dashed
line (green) indicates recipients that returned all (100%)
of the money received (after being multiplied). The
numbers above the curves represent the observations
equal or greater than the curve (not including the two
observations at the origin), the number of individuals
exhibiting the behavior are in parenthesis. (For inter-
pretation of the references to color in this figure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 4. Distribution of contributions by roles. Hollow circles represent data
points (dispersion added for visual purpose).
Table 2
Effect size of contributions to public good by groups.
Comparison Cohen's D Classification⁎
Control - Buyer 0.20 Small
Control - Seller −0.25 Small
Control - Sender −0.13 Negligible
Control - Receiver 0.51 Medium
Buyer - Seller −0.51 Medium
Buyer - Sender −0.36 Small
Buyer - Receiver 0.35 Small
Seller - Sender 0.12 Negligible
Seller - Receiver 0.81 Large
Sender - Receiver 0.66 Medium
Female - Male 0.34 Small
⁎ Classification suggested in Cohen, J. (1988) Statistical power analysis for
the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.) Academic Press, New York.
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4. Discussion
Before addressing the relationship that different roles might have
with contributions, it is important to understand if the behavior found
in the trade, trust, and public goods games conforms to previous find-
ings or not. We found that our trade game equilibrium price was con-
tinually below the expected distribution under equal bargaining power,
and tended to stay under it throughout the rounds, this could be ex-
plained by an anchoring effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) from
low bids which allowed bargaining to move the equilibrium price below
the equal distribution (Galinsky et al., 2009). Another explanation for
sub-equal equilibrium could be that buyers held more bargaining power
than sellers in the game, this could perhaps be explained by players'
own market experience primarily selling fish to the mainland (Cinner
et al., 2005; Lau et al., 2019), or by a perception that buyers would
reject higher prices. The level of bargaining (number of offers) during
the trade game was low. Instead of starting at opposite ends and moving
towards an equilibrium price after multiple counteroffers (Smith,
1982), we saw subjects making initial offers close to the expected
equilibrium price under equal bargaining power and being willing to
accept them often (Hoffman et al., 1994), this suggests a perceived
diminishing value in the bargaining process or perceived asymmetries
in bargaining power.
The level of trust (58% of endowment sent) and money sent back
(52% of the money received by receivers) found in the trust game are
consistent with average findings reported in a meta-analysis of ex-
perimental studies using trust games (Johnson and Mislin, 2011). Al-
though according to Johnson and Mislin (2011), trust and the money
returned (sent back by receivers) should be lower than average when
participants are not students, receivers have an endowment, and
random payments are used (our settings). When compared to studies
conducted in the field, trust and trustworthiness (money sent back) in
our study also seem high. For example, participants in our study trusted
almost twice as much (proportionally) as the Maasai communities in
Kenya (Cronk, 2007), and trusted (~15%) and sent back (~8%) more
than participants from Latin-American countries (Cárdenas et al.,
2009)—although payment was not random in the first study and
interaction was not anonymous in the second. In addition, our trust
game allowed us to build on previous applications of the ultimatum
game in Papua New Guinea (Henrich et al., 2001; Tracer, 2003) by
providing an opportunity for receivers to send money back to the sen-
ders. Henrich et al. (2001) suggested that hyper-fair offers (> 50% of
the sender's endowment) were rejected in the ultimatum game likely
due to a desire to avoid potential reciprocal obligations in the future. If
reciprocal obligations were in fact the reason, we would rarely find
receivers sending nothing back if they were trusted, while re-
turning> 50% to the sender should be common when initial offers
were hyper-fair (as a means of diffusing potential future obligations).
Instead, we found the opposite, multiple instances of receivers sending
nothing back (or sending less than what it was originally sent), and
receivers returning>50% of what they received being independent of
hyper-fairness.
In public goods, the level of cooperation (contributions to the public
good) ranges from the social optimal full contribution (Pareto-efficient)
to the free-riding zero contribution, with most experimental evidence
pointing to cooperation in a range between 40% and 60% of available
endowment (Ledyard, 1994; Chaudhuri, 2011), but this tends to de-
crease during repeated rounds of play (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Co-
operation found in our study is at the lower end of the expected range
(46% overall), despite using a small group size and a large expected
benefit from a unit contribution (for each unit contributed a person
received 66% of it)—both settings often associated with higher co-
operation (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007; Ledyard, 1994). The relative
low contributions might be associated to differences between lab ex-
periments in college campuses and the field, in particular rural low-
income areas where people are more reliant on daily earnings. Also,
cooperation could be reflecting the context in which the experiment
was carried out. At Ahus Island, fishery resources were historically
managed through customary practices such as fishing restrictions and
protected areas, which had demonstrable benefits to fish stocks (Cinner
et al., 2005). However, over the last 16 years, these collective action
systems have broken down (Lau et al. 2018), and fish stocks in Ahus
were the most depleted in a global assessment of coral reef fisheries
(MacNeil et al. 2015). Thus, the breakdown in real cooperation re-
garding actual fisheries management may be reflected in the game.
As the results from the trade, trust, and public good game are within
the range of previous findings we can now look at the behavioral
spillovers from trust and trade games on cooperation in a public goods
game. Previous research has examined how markets might affect be-
havior in economic games by comparing game outcomes along a gra-
dient of market integration (Henrich et al. 2011). For example, previous
research in Papua New Guinea has found that more market integrated
communities contributed less to an ultimatum game (Tracer, 2003).
Our investigation attempted to build on this work by examining whe-
ther a market or a trust context might spillover into cooperative be-
havior. Regarding an overall ‘context effect’ or framing, we did not find
an unambiguous relationship with trade or trust, perhaps suggesting
that, unlike the area of markets and externalities (Falk and Szech, 2013;
Bartling et al., 2015b), context influence in public goods might be more
nuanced. A specific nuance is that, although general context was not
related to public goods contributions, individual roles were, suggesting
the existence of spillovers from specific rather than more general con-
texts into public good contributions. In particular, roles within treat-
ments seemed to have opposite effects (e.g., contributions by senders
were high and by receivers low), and the role ‘receiver’ was sig-
nificantly lower than the control group. Since the roles within the
context had an opposite relationships with cooperation in the public
good, the overall relationship with context was ambiguous.
Our findings are in line with previous studies as the evidence of
behavioral spillovers is mixed at best. For example regarding co-
operation, and using a lab experiment, Cason and Gangadharan (2013)
found that sellers successfully coordinated to fund a research project
but did not extended that collaboration into lower competition (higher
Fig. 5. Coefficient plot of how contributions to public goods games are related
to role in previous game (buyer, seller, receiver, sender), gender, age, and
earnings in the previous game. Estimates are relative to the control group,
where no previous game was played. Thick lines represent stand errors (SE)
while thin lines are 95% confidence intervals. Red indicated that the 95%
confidence intervals do not cross zero. (For interpretation of the references to
color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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collusion) in the market, suggesting no spillovers in cooperation. A
related study using minimum and median effort coordination games
found spillovers only from the medium effort game into the minimum
effort game (Cason et al., 2012). Studies testing the influence of market
context found that exposure to market games increased preferences'
stability in non-market settings (Cherry et al., 2003; Cherry and
Shogren, 2007). Also using a market context, other studies found that
exposure to trade decreased other regarding behavior when decisions
generated externalities (Falk and Szech, 2013; Bartling et al., 2015a);
although another study using similar games found no spillover (Kirchler
et al., 2015). In the area of pro-environmental behavior the evidence is
also mixed, finding in one case that encouraging ‘green’ purchases in-
creased recycling (Lanzini and Thøgersen, 2014), while in another re-
cycling decreased support for pro-environmental policy (Truelove et al.,
2016). Unlike previous studies, our results suggest it is necessary to
look within contexts and not only to the overall influence a context
might have, as behavior specific to particular roles within a context
might be generating spillovers into other behaviors.
Finally, gender was related to contributions to public goods and
mediates spillovers from the trade and trust games into cooperation,
with male subjects being less cooperative than their female counter-
parts after participating in trade and trust games. This finding is
broadly consistent with Tracer (2003), who found that females in Papua
New Guinea proposed larger offers in an ultimatum game than males
(though this relationship was not statistically significant), and with
Croson and Buchanan (1999) who found that women returned more on
average than men in an international comparison of trust games.
Our study is an important first step in examining whether there are
behavioral spillovers from different contexts into public goods games,
but it is limited in understanding framing in public goods. Future stu-
dies should consider an alternative design aimed to understand framing
effects, instead for behavioral spillovers, in public goods. Our design
has other shortcomings that could be addressed in future studies. First,
we only focus on the existence of behavioral spillovers from two par-
ticular contexts into contributions to public goods. Second, our study is
correlational, not causal and does not identify a mechanism through
which our observed role spillover operates. Third, the control lacks a
task preceding the public good games, making the comparison between
treatment and control (but not between treatments) less precise.
Fourth, alternating roles in the different context could smooth differ-
ences between the roles.
5. Conclusions
People's preferences can be context dependent and contributions to
public goods are not an exception. Our results do not support an overall
unambiguous effect of the market or trust context spilling over into
contributions to public goods, since the different roles (seller/buyer,
sender/receiver) within a context have opposite effects on contribu-
tions. However, we do find that roles within the contexts are important
and can generate behavioral spillovers over public goods contributions.
As conservation initiatives increase their, direct or indirect, reliance on
public goods to achieve their goals, the existence of behavioral spillover
into contributions can render conservation programs ineffective (if the
spillover decreases contribution) or inefficient (if the spillover increases
contribution). The successful implementation of conservation programs
that rely on public goods require an understanding of the potential
spillovers different contexts (e.g. markets created by market-based
mechanisms or trust relied upon by community-based mechanism) and
the roles within them (i.e. buyers/sellers, trustors/trustees) can have.
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Appendix 1. Tables
Trust Game: Trust and trustworthiness by rounds
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Trust Mean 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.1 2.9 2.9
SD 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6
Trusworthiness Mean 4.2 4.5 4.6 4.4 4.8 4.8 4.6
SD 3.6 3.6 4.4 3.6 4.2 4.4 4.0
Trade Game: Price by rounds
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Price Mean 5.4 5.9 5.5 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.8
SD 2.5 1.8 1.9 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.3
Trade Game: Offer Table (Buyers)
Bid N 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
1 144 Mean 4.3 5.3 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.9 5.4
SD 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.5
2 118 Mean 5.2 5.5 5.1 5.9 6.0 5.1 5.4
SD 2.6 2.5 1.7 3.0 2.3 2.2 2.4
3 18 Mean 5.7 6.3 6.0 4.9 7.6 5.9 6.1
SD 1.3 0.6 0.5 2.4 – 0.9 1.1
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4 7 Mean 4.0 5.0 5.0 8.0 5.7 5.5
SD – 1.4 – 1.0 1.2
5 4 Mean 5.0 4.4 6.0 5.1
SD – – – –
6 3 Mean 5.4 5.0 7.0 5.8
SD – – – –
7 2 Mean 5.6 7.8 6.7
SD – – –
8 1 Mean 7.8 7.8
SD – –
9 1 Mean 7.8 7.8
SD – –
10 1 Mean 7.8 7.8
SD – –
Trade Game: Offer Table (Sellers)
Ask N 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
1 144 Mean 6.7 7.4 7.0 7.3 7.3 7.7 7.2
SD 3.3 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.1 3.6 3.1
2 78 Mean 7.0 9.6 6.4 6.6 7.3 7.3 7.4
SD 2.1 14.9 1.6 1.8 2.9 2.9 4.4
3 16 Mean 10.1 6.2 6.4 6.0 9.0 7.8 7.6
SD 3.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 2.8 3.0 1.6
4 7 Mean 5.6 5.0 5.0 10.6 9.0 7.0
SD 0.6 – – 4.2 2.4
5 4 Mean 6.0 5.0 8.0 11.8 7.7
SD – – – – –
6 2 Mean 5.6 10.4 8.0
SD – – –
7 1 Mean 10.0 10.0
SD – –
8 1 Mean 9.8 9.8
SD – –
9 1 Mean 8.8 8.8
SD – –
10 1 Mean 7.8 7.8
SD – –
Appendix 2. Models
Model using Context
Linear regression for contributions to group fund in the public good game.
Constant 3.08⁎⁎⁎
(0.25)
Market Context 0.13
(0.33)
Trust Context −0.27
(0.32)
Earning first game −0.1⁎⁎⁎
(0.05)
Age 0.01
(0.01)
Male −0.58⁎⁎
(0.26)
Observation 150
p-Value 0.053
Note: Earnings in first game and age are centered at the mean. Standard errors in parenthesis.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Significant at the 5% level.
⁎ Significant at the 10% level.
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Model using Roles
Linear regression for contributions to group fund in public good game.
Constant 3.09⁎⁎⁎
(0.25)
Role: Buyer −0.12
(0.40)
Role: Seller 0.45
(0.40)
Role: Receiver −0.80⁎⁎⁎
(0.39)
Role: Sender 0.26
(0.39)
Earning first game −0.06
(0.05)
Age 0.01
(0.01)
Male −0.61⁎⁎
(0.26)
Observation 150
p-value 0.016
Note: Earnings in first game and age are centered at the mean. Standard errors in par-
enthesis.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Significant at the 5% level.
⁎ Significant at the 10% level.
Appendix 3. Data and supplementary material
Data used in this article are openly available on James Cook University’s Tropical Research Hub [https://doi.org/10.25903/5e8548786bbf4].
Supplementary material to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106661.
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